Stable project allocation under distributional constraints by Ágoston, Kolos Csaba et al.
Operations Research Perspectives 5 (2018) 59–68 
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
Operations Research Perspectives 
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/orp 
Stable project allocation under distributional constraints  
Kolos Csaba Ágoston a , Péter Birób , c , 1 , ∗, Richárd Szántód 
a Department of Operations Research and Actuarial Sciences, Corvinus University of Budapest, Fövám tér 13-15, Budapest H-1093, Hungary 
b Institute of Economics, Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budaörsi út 45, Budapest H-1112, Hungary 
c Department of Operations Research and Actuarial Sciences, Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary 
d Department of Decision Sciences, Corvinus University of Budapest, Fövám tér 13-15, Budapest H-1093, Hungary 
a r t i c l e i n f o 
Article history: 
Received 19 January 2018 
Accepted 19 January 2018 
Keywords: 
Assignment 
Stable matching 
Two-sided markets 
Project allocation 
Integer linear programming 
a b s t r a c t 
In a two-sided matching market when agents on both sides have preferences the stability of the solution 
is typically the most important requirement. However, we may also face some distributional constraints 
with regard to the minimum number of assignees or the distribution of the assignees according to their 
types. These two requirements can be challenging to reconcile in practice. In this paper we describe two 
real applications, a project allocation problem and a workshop assignment problem, both involving some 
distributional constraints. We used integer programming techniques to ﬁnd reasonably good solutions 
with regard to the stability and the distributional constraints. Our approach can be useful in a variety of 
different applications, such as resident allocation with lower quotas, controlled school choice or college 
admissions with aﬃrmative action. 
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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2. Introduction 
A centralised matching scheme has been used since 1952 in the
S to allocate junior doctors to hospitals [40] . Later, the same tech-
ology has been used in school choice programs in large cities,
uch as New York [3] and Boston [4] . Similar schemes have been
stablished in Europe for university admissions and school choice
s well. For instance, in Hungary both the secondary school and
he higher education admission schemes are organised nationwide,
ee [12] and [13] , respectively. Furthermore, it can also be used
o allocate courses to students under priorities [20] . In the above
entioned applications it is common that the preferences of the
pplicants and the rankings of the parties on the other side are
ollected by a central coordinator and a so-called stable allocation
s computed based on the matching algorithm of Gale and Shapley
26] . Two-sided matching markets, and the above applications in
articular, have been extensively studied in the last decades, see A preliminary version of this paper has appeared in the proceedings of the 10th 
apanese-Hungarian Symposium on Discrete Mathematics and its Applications, 2017. 
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ional aspects, respectively. 
In this paper we describe two recent applications at the Corvi-
us University of Budapest, where we used a similar method with
ome interesting caveats. In the ﬁrst application we had to allocate
tudents to projects in such a way that the number of students
llocated to each project is between a lower and an upper quota,
ogether with an additional requirement over the distribution of
he foreign students. This is a natural requirement present in many
pplications, such as the Japanese resident allocation scheme [30] .
n the second application we scheduled students to companies for
olving case studies in a conference, and here again we faced some
istributional constraints. 
We decided to use integer programming techniques for solv-
ng both applications. We had at least three reasons for choos-
ng this technique. The ﬁrst is that with IP formulations we can
asily encode those distributional requirements that the organisers
equested, so this solution method is robust to accommodate spe-
ial features. The second reason is that the computational problem
ecame NP-hard as the companies submitted lists with ties. Using
ies in the ranking was by our recommendation to the companies,
ecause ties give us more ﬂexibility when ﬁnding a stable solution
nder the distributional constraints. We describe this issue more in
etail shortly. Finally, our third reason for choosing IP techniques
as that it facilitates multi-objective optimisation, e.g. ﬁnding ander the CC BY-NC-ND license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 
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a  most-stable solution if a stable solution does not exist under the
strict distributional constraints. 
The usage of integer programming techniques for solving two-
sided stable matching problems is very rare in the applications,
and the theoretical studies on this topic have only started very
recently. The reason is that the problems are relatively large in
most applications, and the Gale-Shapley type heuristics are usually
able to ﬁnd stable solutions, even in potentially challenging cases.
A classical example is the resident allocation problem with cou-
ples, which has been present in the US application for decades, and
it is still solved by the Roth-Peranson heuristic [42] . The underly-
ing matching problem is NP-hard [39] , but heuristic solutions are
quite successful in practice, see also [14] on the Scottish applica-
tion. However, integer programming and constraint programming
techniques have been developed very recently and they turned out
to be powerful enough to solve large random instances [15,18,21] .
Similarly encouraging results have been obtained for some spe-
cial college admission problems, which are present in the Hungar-
ian higher education system. These special features also make the
problem NP-hard in general, but at least one of these challenging
features, turned out to be solvable even with real data involving
more than 150,0 0 0 applicants [6] . Finally, the last paper that we
highlight with regard to this topic deals with the problem of ﬁnd-
ing stable solutions in the presence of ties [34] . However, we are
not aware of any papers that would study IP techniques for the
problem of distributional constraints. 
Distributional constraints are present in many two-sided
matching markets. In the Japanese resident allocation the gov-
ernment wants to ensure that the doctors are evenly distributed
across the country, and to achieve this they imposed lower quo-
tas on the number of doctors allocated in each region [27,30–
32] . Distributional objectives can also appear in school choice
programs, where the decision makers want to control the socio-
ethnical distribution of the students [2,17,22,23,33] . Nguyen and
Vohra [37] studied a special case where soft constraints are im-
posed on the proportion of different types of students. Further-
more, the same kind of requirements are implemented in college
admission schemes with aﬃrmative action [1] such as the Brazilian
college admission system [8] and the admission scheme to Indian
engineering schools [9] . 
Finally, there is a recent line of research by mathematicians on
so-called classiﬁed stable matchings, where the problem of ﬁnding
a stable solution under lower and upper quotas over certain types
of applicants. Huang [28] gave an eﬃcient algorithm for laminar
set systems, which was generalised by Fleiner and Kamada [25] is
a matroid framework, and further extended by Yokoi [44] for poly-
matroids. Finally, Yokoi provided an eﬃcient method for ﬁnding
an envy-free matching for so-called paramodular lower and up-
per quota functions, if such a solution exists, and she also proves
that the problem is NP-hard in the general setting. A model with
one-sided preferences and ditributional constraints was studied re-
cently in [7] . 
When stable solutions do not exist for the strict distributional
constraints then we either need to relax stability or to adjust the
distributional constraints. In this study we will consider the trade-
off between these two goals, and develop some reasonable solution
concepts. 
Here, we brieﬂy describe our deﬁnitions and solution concepts,
the precise formulations will follow as we develop our model and
solution concepts under extending sets of constraints. In our model
the applicants submit their strict preferences on the companies
and the companies provide weak rankings over the applicants. The
companies have lower and upper quotas respecting the number
of assignees. A matching is feasible if it respects these quotas. A
matching is stable if for any applicant-company pair not in the
matching either the applicant prefers her matching or the com-any has ﬁlled its upper quota with weakly higher ranked appli-
ants. A matching is envy-free if no applicant has a justiﬁed envy
owards another applicant, meaning that she prefers the company
here the other applicant is admitted to her assignment and she is
lso ranked strictly higher by that company than the other appli-
ant. An envy-free matching may be wasteful, meaning that there
an be unﬁlled companies that are preferred by some applicants to
heir assignments. A matching is stable if and only if it is envy-free
nd non-wasteful. When the applicants have types then we may
lso have lower and upper quotas with respect to the types, which
ave to be obeyed for the feasibility of the matching. These quo-
as may apply for individual companies (as in our ﬁrst application),
or sets of companies, or for all companies (as in our second appli-
ation). In our model (and motivating applications) the applicants
re partitioned according to their types (such as domestic and for-
ign students). A matching is within-type envy-free if there is no
ustiﬁed envy between any two students of the same type. 
Regarding the solution concepts, we are focusing on “almost
tability”. A stable matching may not exist when both lower and
pper quotas are imposed. In this case a natural solution is to look
or an envy-free matching, which is as non-wasteful as possible. If
nvy-free matching does not exist either, then we may want to ﬁnd
 feasible matching where the number of pairs with justiﬁed envy
s minimised. If the applicants have types and an envy-free match-
ng does not exist, then we can look for within-type envy-free
atchings. This solution is guaranteed to exist under some natural
ssumptions, which are satisﬁed in our applications ( Theorem 1 ).
e can also characterise these matchings by the usage of type-
peciﬁc scores, where the applicants of certain types can get ex-
ra scores ( Theorem 2 ). Finally, among the within-type envy-free
atchings we may want to minimise envy across types, i.e. min-
mise the pairs of applicants with different types that have justi-
ed envies. In this minimisation we can simply take the number
f such pairs, or alternatively we can consider the intensity of the
nvy (how much higher the rejected applicant is compared to an
nfairly accepted applicant) and we may aim to minimise the total
ntensity of the envies. 
We developed integer programming formulations to solve these
roblems arising from two real applications, and we report the so-
utions that we obtained in our case studies. 
. Deﬁnitions and preliminaries 
Many-to-one stable matching markets have been deﬁned in
any contexts in the literature. In the classical college admissions
roblem by Gale and Shapley [26] the students are matched to
olleges. In the computer science literature this problem setting
s typically called Hospital / Residents problem (HR), due to the
ational Resident Matching Program (NRMP) and other related ap-
lications. In our paper we will refer the two sets as applicants
 = { a 1 , . . . , a n } and companies C = { c 1 , . . . c m } . Let u j denote the
pper quota of company c j . 
Regarding the preferences, we assume that the applicants pro-
ide strict rankings over the companies, but the companies may
ave ties in their rankings. The preference lists of the applicants
ay be incomplete in our model (so not all the applicant-company
air is possible), but in our applications the preference lists are
omplete, and this condition is also used in some of our theoreti-
al results. This model is sometimes referred to as Hospital / Resi-
ents problem with Ties (HRT) in the computer science literature,
ee e.g. [35] . In our context, let r ij denote the rank of company c j 
n a i ’s preference list, meaning that applicant a i prefers c j to c k if
nd only if r ij < r ik . Let s ij be an integer representing the score of a i
y company c j , meaning that a i is preferred over a k by company c j 
f s ij > s kj . Note that here two applicants may have the same score
t a company, so s i j = s k j is possible. Let s¯ denote the maximum
K.C. Ágoston et al. / Operations Research Perspectives 5 (2018) 59–68 61 
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2 Strategyproofness is an important desiderata in matching markets. However, 
there are many applications where the mechanisms used are not (fully) strate- 
gyproof, see [11] . The solution concepts that we use in our approach, stability 
and envy-freeness seem to provide some guarantee against manipulation by naïve 
agents. This is because stability (and envy-freeness) can be validated by the cutoff
scores, which are the scores of the weakest admitted applicants at the companies 
(or universities in college admissions). The naïve agents believe that they cannot 
affect the cutoff scores, which is actually a realistic assumption in many large ap- 
plications, and thus under that assumption submitting their true preferences is ob- 
viously the best strategy. We had no complain reported about this aspect of our 
mechanism from the students’ side. ossible score at any company and let E be the set of applications.
 matching is a subset of applications, where each applicant is as-
igned to at most one company and the number of assignees at
ach company is less than or equal to the upper quota. A matching
s complete if every student is allocated. A matching is said to be
table if for any applicant-company pair not included in the match-
ng either the applicant is matched to a more preferred company
r the company ﬁlled its upper quota with applicants of the same
r higher scores. 
In the classical college admission problem, that we refer to as
R, a stable solution is guaranteed to exist, and the two-versions
f the Gale-Shapley algorithm [26] ﬁnd either a student-optimal
r a college optimal solution, respectively. Furthermore, this algo-
ithm can be implemented to run in linear time in the number
f applications. Moreover, the student-proposing variant was also
roved to be strategyproof for the students [40] , which means that
o student can ever get a better partner by submitting false pref-
rences. Finally, the so-called Rural Hospitals Theorem [41] states
hat the same students are matched in every stable solution, the
umber of assignees does not vary across stable matchings for any
ollege, and for the less popular colleges where the upper quota is
ot ﬁlled the set of assigned students is ﬁxed. 
When extending the classical college admission problem with
he possibility of having ties in the colleges’ rankings, that we re-
erred to as an HRT instance, the existence of a stable solution is
till guaranteed, since we can break the ties arbitrarily, and a sta-
le solution for the strict preferences is also stable for the origi-
al ones. However, now the set of matched students and the size
f the stable matchings can vary. Take just the following simple
xample: we have two applicants, a 1 and a 2 ﬁrst applying to col-
ege c 1 with the same score and applicant a 2 also applies to college
 2 as her second choice. Here, if we break the tie at c 1 in favour
f a 1 then we get the matching a 1 c 1 , a 2 c 2 , whilst if we break the
ie in favour of a 2 then the resulting stable matching is a 2 c 1 (thus
 1 is unmatched). The problem of ﬁnding a maximum size stable
atching turned out to be NP-hard [36] , and has been studied ex-
ensively in the computer science literature, see e.g. [35] . Note that
hen the objective of an application is to ﬁnd a maximum size
table matching, such as the Scottish resident allocation scheme
29] , then the mechanism is not strategyproof. To see this, we just
ave to reconsider the above example, and assume that originally
 1 also found c 2 acceptable and would rank it second, just like a 2 .
y removing c 2 from her list, a 1 is now guaranteed to get c 1 in
he maximum size stable solution, however, for the original true
references a 2 would have an equal chance to get her ﬁrst choice
 1 . 
.1. Introduction of lower quotas 
In our ﬁrst application the organisers of the project allocations
anted to ensure a minimum number of students for each com-
any. Similar requirements have been imposed for the Japanese
egions with regard to the number of residents allocated there. In
ur model, we introduce a lower quota l j for each company c j and
e require that in a feasible matching the number of assignees at
ny company is between the lower and upper quotas. Stability is
eﬁned as before. We refer to the setting with strict preferences
s Hospitals / Residents problem with Lower quotas (HRL) and the
ase with ties is referred to as Hospitals / Residents problem with
ies and Lower Quotas (HRTL). 
Regarding HRL, the Rural Hospitals Theorem implies that the
xistence of a stable matching that obeys both the lower an up-
er quotas can be decided eﬃciently. This is because we just ﬁnd
ne stable matching by considering the upper quotas only, and if
he lower quotas are violated then there exists no stable solution
nder these distributional constraints. This problem can be stillolved eﬃciently when the sets of companies have common lower
nd upper quotas in a laminar system, see [25] . 
However, the problem of deciding the existence of a stable
atching for HRTL is NP-hard. To see this, we just have to re-
ark that the problem of ﬁnding a complete stable matching for
RT with unit quotas is also NP-hard [36] , so if we require both
ower and upper quotas to be equal to one for all companies then
he two problems are equivalent. Furthermore, no mechanism that
nds a stable matching whenever there exists one can be strate-
yproof. 2 
.2. Adding types and distributional constraints 
In our ﬁrst application, the organisers want to distribute the
oreign students across the projects almost equally. In our second
pplication, there are target numbers for the total number of Hun-
arian, European and other participants and there are also speciﬁc
ower quotas for Hungarian students by some companies. These
pplications motivate our problems with applicant types and dis-
ributional constraints. 
Let T = { T 1 , . . . , T p } be the set of types, where t ( a i ) denotes the
ype of applicant a i . For a company c j , let l 
k 
j 
and u k 
j 
denote the
ower and upper quota for the number of assignees of type T k . Fur-
hermore, we may also set lower and upper quotas for any type
f applicants for a set of companies. In particular, we denote the
ower and upper quotas for the total number of applicants of type
 
k assigned in the matching by L k and U k , respectively. The set of
easibility constraints for the matching is now extended with these
ower and upper quotas. Yet, the original stability condition, which
oes not consider the types of the applicants, remains the same. 
. Solution concepts and integer programming formulations 
In all of our formulations we use binary variables x ij ∈ {0, 1} for
ach application coming from applicant a i to company c j . This can
e seen as a characteristic function of the matching, where x i j = 1
orresponds to the case when a i is assigned to c j . 
When describing the integer formulations, ﬁrst we keep the sta-
ility condition ﬁxed while we implement the set of distributional
onstraints. Then we investigate the ways one can relax stability or
nd most-stable solutions under the distributional constraints. 
.1. Finding stable solutions under distributional constraints 
In this subsection we gradually add constraints to the model
hile keeping the classical stability condition. 
lassical HR instance 
First we describe the basic IP formulation for HR described in
10] . The feasibility of a matching can be ensured with the follow-
ng two sets of constraints. ∑ 
j:(a i ,c j ) ∈ E 
x i j ≤ 1 for each a i ∈ A (1) 
62 K.C. Ágoston et al. / Operations Research Perspectives 5 (2018) 59–68 
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i :(a i ,c j ) ∈ E 
x i j ≤ u j for each c j ∈ C (2)
Note that (1) implies that no applicant can be assigned to more
than one company, and (2) implies that the upper quotas of the
companies are respected. 3 
To enforce the stability of a feasible matching we can use the
following constraint. ( ∑ 
k : r ik ≤r i j 
x ik 
) 
· u j + 
∑ 
h :(a h ,c j ) ∈ E,s h j >s i j 
x h j ≥ u j for each (a i , c j ) ∈ E (3)
Note that for each ( a i , c j ) ∈ E , if a i is matched to c j or to a more
preferred company then the ﬁrst term provides the satisfaction of
the inequality. Otherwise, when the ﬁrst term is zero, then the sec-
ond term is greater than or equal to the right hand side if and only
if the places at c j are ﬁlled with applicants with higher scores. 
Among the stable solutions we can choose the applicant-
optimal one by minimising the following objective function. ∑ 
(a i ,c j ) ∈ E 
r i j · x i j 
Modiﬁcation for HRT 
When the companies can express ties the following modi-
ﬁed stability constraints, together with the feasibility constraints
(1) and (2) , lead to stable matchings. Note that here the only dif-
ference between this and the previous constraint is that the strict
inequality s hj > s ij became weak. ( ∑ 
k : r ik ≤r i j 
x ik 
) 
· u j + 
∑ 
h :(a h ,c j ) ∈ E,s h j ≥s i j 
x h j ≥ u j for each (a i , c j ) ∈ E (4)
Extension with lower quotas 
Here, we only add the lower quotas for every company. ∑ 
i :(a i ,c j ) ∈ E 
x i j ≥ l j for each c j ∈ C (5)
Adding distributional constraints 
As additional constraints we require the number of assignees of
a particular type to be between the lower and upper quotas for
that type at a company. ∑ 
i : t(a i )= T k , (a i ,c j ) ∈ E 
x i j ≤ u k j for each c j ∈ C and T k ∈ T (6)
∑ 
i : t(a i )= T k , (a i ,c j ) ∈ E 
x i j ≥ l k j for each c j ∈ C and T k ∈ T (7)
We can also add similar constraints for sets of companies, or for
the overall number of assignees at certain types at all companies.
We describe the latter, as we will use it when solving our second
application. ∑ 
i, j: t(a i )= T k , (a i ,c j ) ∈ E 
x i j ≤ U k for each T k ∈ T (8)
∑ 
x i j ≥ L k for each T k ∈ T (9)i, j: t(a i )= T k , (a i ,c j ) ∈ E 
3 These conditions are standard for the assignment problem as well, see a survey 
on this problem and its variants [38] and an interesting application on marriage 
markets [19] . 
s  
s  
n  
t  
O  .2. Relaxing stability 
Adding additional constraints to the problem can cause the lack
f a stable matching, even if we added some ﬂexibility with the
ies. 
One way to ﬁnd a most-stable solution is to introduce nonneg-
tive deﬁciency variables, d ij for each application and add them to
he left side of the stability constraint (4) . By minimising the sum
f these deﬁciencies as a ﬁrst objective we can obtain a solution
hich is close to be stable. 
 ∑ 
k : r ik ≤r i j 
x ik 
) 
· u j + 
∑ 
h :(a h ,c j ) ∈ E,s h j ≥s i j 
x h j + d i j ≥ u j for each (a i , c j ) ∈ E 
(10)
Note that here, if a pair ( a i , c j ) is blocking for the assignment
hen we need to add more compensation d ij if the number of as-
ignees at c j that the company prefers to a i is large. This approach
an be reasonable if we want to avoid the refusal of a very good
andidate at a company. We call this solution as matching with
inimum deﬁciency . 
Alternatively, if we just want to minimise the number of block-
ng pairs then we can set d ij to be binary and minimise the sum of
hese variables under the following modiﬁed constraints. 
 ∑ 
k : r ik ≤r i j 
x ik 
) 
· u j + 
∑ 
h :(a h ,c j ) ∈ E,s h j ≥s i j 
x h j + d i j · u j 
≥ u j for each (a i , c j ) ∈ E (11)
Here, every blocking pair should be compensated by the same
mount, so the number of blocking pairs in minimised. Note that
his concept has already been studied in the literature for various
odels under the name of almost stable matchings , see e.g. [18] . 
.3. Adjusting upper capacities, envy-free matchings 
A different way of enforcing the lower quota is to relax stability
y artiﬁcially decreasing the capacities of the companies. This was
lso the solution in the resident allocation scheme in Japan [30] ,
here the government introduced artiﬁcial upper quotas for each
f the hospitals, so that in each region the sum of these artiﬁcial
pper bounds summed up to the target capacity for that region. In
he case of our motivating example of project allocation, one sim-
le way of achieving the lower quotas was by reducing the upper
uotas at every company. 
In this solution what we essentially get is a so-called envy-
ree matching , studied in [5,45,46] . For a matching M applicant a i 
as justiﬁed envy towards a j if a i prefers M ( a j ) to M ( a i ) and a i
s ranked strictly higher than a j at M ( a j ). If a matching is free of
ustiﬁed envy then we call it envy-free . A matching that is stable
ith respect to the artiﬁcial upper quotas, is envy-free for the orig-
nal quotas. This means that the only blocking pairs that may oc-
ur with regard to the original upper quotas are due to the empty
lots created by the difference between the original and the artiﬁ-
ial quotas, that we call open-slot blockings . 
However, one may not want to reduce the upper quotas of the
ompanies in the same way, perhaps some more popular compa-
ies should be allowed to have more students than the less popu-
ar ones. Furthermore, maybe the decision on which upper quotas
hould be reduced should be made depending on their effect of
atisfying the lower quotas (or other requirements). Thus, we may
ot want to set the artiﬁcial upper quotas in advance, but keep
hem as variables, by ensuring envy-freeness in a different way.
ne alternative way of enforcing envy-freeness is by the following
K.C. Ágoston et al. / Operations Research Perspectives 5 (2018) 59–68 63 
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iet of constraints. ∑ 
 : r ik ≤r i j 
x ik ≥ x h j ∀ (a i , c j ) , (a h , c j ) ∈ E, s i j > s h j (12)
Constraints (12) will ensure envy-freeness, by making sure that
f applicant a h is assigned to company c j and applicant a i has
igher score than a h at c j then a i must be assigned to c j or to a
ore preferred company. 
.4. Within-type priorities 
So far we have only considered different approaches of relax-
ng stability or enlarging the set of feasible solutions in order to
atisfy the distributional constraints. In this subsection we study
lternative solution concepts and methods for the case when the
istributional constraints are type-dependent. This is the case also
n our motivating application, where special requirements are set
or the foreign students assigned to the companies. 
When the number of students of a type does not achieve the
inimum required at a place then there are two well-known ap-
roaches. For instance in a school choice scenario, where the ratio
f an socio-ethnic group should be improved (see e.g. [2] ) then one
ossible aﬃrmative action is to increase the scores of that group
f students as much as needed. The other usual solution is to set
ome reserved seats to those students (see e.g. [8] ). 
In our project allocation application our requirement is to have
t least one foreign student assigned to every company. If in a sta-
le solution this condition would be violated for a popular com-
any that ranks the foreign students low then we can try to en-
orce the admission of a foreign student by increasing the scores
f the foreign students at this company. By adjusting the scores of
 certain type of students at a company we mean that we increase
or decrease) the scores of these students at that company by the
ame amount of points. We call a matching stable with type-speciﬁc
cores , if the matching is stable for some type-speciﬁcally adjusted
cores. The second approach is to devote one place at each com-
any to foreign students. For this one seat the foreign students will
ave higher priority than the locals irrespective of their scores, but
or the rest of the spaces the usual score-based rankings apply. We
all this concept as stable matching with reserved seats for types .
ote that neither of these two concepts can always ensure that we
et at least one foreign student at each company, since they may
ll have high scores and they may all dislike a particular company.
owever, this situation changes if we also allow to decrease the
cores of a group of students. We will describe this case after dis-
ussing the third approach. 
Finally, as a third approach, we can also extend the concept
f envy-free matchings for types. We do not require any stability
ith regard to students of different types, but we do require envy-
reeness for students of the same type. Thus the so-called within-
ype envy-free matchings will be those who satisfy the following set
f constraints. 4 ∑ 
 : r ik ≤r i j 
x ik ≥ x h j 
 (a i , c j ) , (a h , c j ) ∈ E, s i j > s h j , t(a i ) = t(a h ) = T k , T k ∈ T (13) 
That is, if a i and a h have the same type and a h is assigned to
 j then the higher ranked a i must also be assigned to c j or to a
ore preferred company. Note that with this modiﬁcation we ex-
end the set of feasible solutions compared to the set of envy-free
atchings. Another important observation that is motivated by our
roject allocation problem is that under some realistic assumptions4 This solution concept was called within-type -compatibility by Echenique and 
enmez [22] . 
 
C  
b  
e within-type envy-free matching always exists, that we will show
n the following theorem. 
heorem 1. Suppose that all the companies are acceptable to every
tudent and that the sum of the lower quotas with regard to each
ype is less than or equal to the number of students of that type, and
he sum of the lower quotas across types for a company is less than
r equal to the upper quota of that company, then a complete within-
ype envy-free matching always exists and can be found eﬃciently. 
roof. We construct a within-type envy-free matching separately
or each type and then we merge them at the end of the process.
hen considering a particular type T k , we set artiﬁcial upper quo-
as at the companies to be equal to the type-speciﬁc lower quotas
i.e. l k 
j 
for company c j ) and we ﬁnd a stable matching M k for this
ype. This stable matching must exist, since we assumed that all
he companies are acceptable to every student and the number of
tudents in every type is at least as much as the sum of the lower
uotas for that type. We create matching M by merging the sta-
le matchings for the types, i.e. M = M 1 ∪ M 2 ∪ · · · ∪ M p . Note that
o upper quota is violated in M , since we assumed that the sum of
he lower quotas across types for any company c j is less than equal
o the upper quota of c j . By the stability of M k for every type T 
k it
ollows that matching M is within-type envy-free. If there is still
 company c j , where the overall lower quota ( l j ) is not yet met,
hen we increase an artiﬁcial upper quota for some type T k at c j 
o that there is still some unmatched applicants of this type. This
djustment will affect the corresponding stable matching M k for
his type, and therefore also M by allocating one more applicant of
ype T k to c j in both M k and M . Since the total number of appli-
ants is greater or equal to the sum of the lower quotas, we must
e able to achieve the lower quotas at all companies in this way.
inally, if there are still some unmatched applicants then we in-
rease some artiﬁcial upper quotas for their types one-by-one at
ny company c j , where the original upper quota is not yet reached
n M . At the end of this iterative process we obtain a complete
ithin-type envy-free matching, M . 
We note that there is a closely related solution concept in-
roduced by Yokoi [45] which results in a within-type envy-free
atching when restricted to our model, that we describe in de-
ails below. The model studied in that paper is the more general
o-called classiﬁed stable matching problem where each student
an have several types (e.g. gender, ﬁeld of study, nationality) and
he lower and upper quotas are set for every type. When putting
heir more general model in our context a student a i has justiﬁed
nvy towards another student a k at company c j if a k is assigned
o c j , a i prefers c j to her assignment, c j ranks a i higher than a k ,
nd no lower and upper quota is violated for any type when re-
lacing a k with a i at c j . It is easy to see that under the assump-
ions of Theorem 1 an envy-free matching always exists as deﬁned
y Yokoi and such a solution is a within-type envy-free match-
ng according to our deﬁnitions. Finally we remark that this model
f Yokoi is originated from the classiﬁed stable matching problem
ntroduced in [28] , and further generalised in [25,44] . A common
eature of these papers that the laminar nature of the set require-
ents makes the problem polynomial time solvable. A closely re-
ated model was studied in [24] without the laminar assumption,
here the problem was proved to by NP-hard and was solved by
nteger programming techniques. 
Let us abbreviate a complete within-type envy-free matching as
WTEFM. Now, we will compare this concept of CWTEFM with sta-
le matchings with type-speciﬁc scores and observe that they are
ssentially the same. 
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s  Theorem 2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1 a complete match-
ing is within-type envy-free if and only if it is stable with type-speciﬁc
scores. 
Proof. Suppose ﬁrst that M is a complete stable matching with
type-speciﬁc scores, we will see that M is also within-type envy-
free by deﬁnition. Suppose for a contradiction that there is a stu-
dent a i who has justiﬁed envy against student a h of the same
type at company c j , i.e. a h is assigned to c j whilst a i has higher
score at c j than a h and a i is assigned to a less preferred company.
This would mean that the pair { a i , c j } is blocking for the adjusted
scores, since both students get the same adjustment at c j , contra-
dicting with the stability of M . 
Suppose now that M is a CWTEFM. Let us adjust the scores of
the students according to their types at each company such that
the weakest students admitted have the same scores across types.
Matching M is stable with regard to the adjusted scores, because if
a student a i is not admitted to a company c j and any better place
of her preference then it must be the case that her score at c j was
less than or equal to the score of the weakest assigned student
of the same type at c j , which means that the adjusted score of a i 
at c j is less than or equal to the adjusted score of every assigned
student at c j . 
Instead of using the above described processes of setting type-
speciﬁc artiﬁcial upper quotas or making adjustments for the
scores of different types, we can also get a CWTEFM directly by
an IP formulation. We shall simply use the feasibility and distribu-
tional constraints together with (13) and with an objective function
maximising the number of students assigned. This approach is not
just more robust than the above described two heuristics, but it
has also the advantage that we can enforce additional optimality
or fairness criteria. As an additional fairness criterion we may aim
to minimise the envy across types. We can achieve this by adding
deﬁciency variables to the left hand side of constraints (12) for
students of different types, as described in (14) below, and then
minimising the sum of the deﬁciencies. We refer to this solution
as Min#E-CWTEFM, that is complete within-type envy-free matching
with minimum number of envy across types . 
∑ 
k : r ik ≤r i j 
x ik + d j ih ≥ x h j ∀ (a i , c j ) , (a h , c j ) ∈ E, t(a i ) 	 = t(a h ) (14)
However, we may ﬁnd an envy more justiﬁed, if the score dif-
ference between the two applicants involved is higher. Thus, by
taking the score differences as the intensities of the envies, we can
also aim to ﬁnd a reﬁned solution where the total intensities of the
envies is minimised, by using the following objective function: 
∑ 
(s i j − s h j ) · d j ih . 
We call the corresponding solution complete within-type envy-
free matching with minimum envy intensities across types , abbrevi-
ated as MinEI-CWTEFM. 
If the solution is still not unique then we can further reﬁne
it, by considering two additional objectives. Regarding the wel-
fare of the students, we may want to minimise the total rank of
the students, leading to a Pareto-optimal assignment for them un-
der the constraints. We denote these solutions as MinRank-Min#E-
CW TEFM and MinRank-MinEI-CW TEFM, depending whether we
minimised the number of envies or the envy intensities in the
previous round. Finally, an alternative objective can be to min-
imise the number of blocking pairs due to open slots. This can be
achieved by adding binary deﬁciency variables to the ﬁrst term of
the left side of the stability constraints, as follows.  ∑ 
k : r ik ≤r i j 
x ik + d i j 
) 
· u j + 
∑ 
h :(a h ,c j ) ∈ E 
x h j ≥ u j for each (a i , c j ) ∈ E 
(15)
We can then minimise the sum of these deﬁciency variables
nd ﬁnd a matching within the restricted solution set that min-
mises the number of open-slot blockings. We denote these so-
utions as MinOSB-Min#E-CWTEFM and MinOSB-MinEI-CWTEFM,
epending whether we minimised the number of envies or the
nvy intensities. 
. First application: CEMS project allocation 
CEMS Alliance is a global co-operation of leading business
chools, multinational corporations and social partners in higher
ducation domain. These entities run together the CEMS Master in
nternational Management (MIM) one-year graduate program that
s accessible for graduate students of the partner institutions in 29
ountries in ﬁve continents. During the one-year-program students
pend one semester at their home institution and one semester
t another partner institution somewhere abroad, and they always
earn in an international environment. CEMS MIM has been ranked
s a leading master program by Financial Times in recent years. 
Within the framework of the MIM program each student must
arry out a business project during the Spring semester account-
ng for 15ECTS credits (that is half of the workload of the entire
emester). The consultancy-like projects are designed as real life
earning experience. Business projects are done in small groups of
–6 students in which ideally at least one student comes from
 foreign school, hence business project teams are culturally di-
erse. Business projects are offered and supervised by the corpo-
ate partners throughout the semester and they usually last for
hree months. 
Students learn about the business projects during a kickoff
vent at the beginning of the semester from company represen-
atives and they also receive written descriptions of the projects.
fter the kickoff event corporate partners evaluate all students ac-
ording to their CV-s, and students also rank the business projects
n the same time. The school assigns students to the individual
rojects based on these evaluations and rankings. 
At Corvinus University of Budapest the authors of this paper
ave been given the task of redesigning the allocation mechanism
n 2016. In previous years the mechanism was a simple immediate
cceptance mechanism (also known as the Boston mechanism [4] ),
here the students submitted their CV-s to their ﬁrst choice com-
anies, the companies evaluated the candidates and then they ac-
epted the best candidates up to their quotas and rejected the rest.
he rejected students then submitted their CV-s to further compa-
ies, but those companies which have already ﬁlled their positions
id not accept more applications. This mechanism was heavily crit-
cized in the literature on school choice due to its unfairness and
lso because this mechanism is highly manipulable, therefore in
any cities it has been replaced by other algorithms, mainly by
he deferred acceptance (or Gale-Shapley) algorithm, see e.g. [4] . 
.1. Solution plan 
In 2016 there were 25 students, including 20 local and 5 for-
ign students, and 5 companies. The initial upper quotas were set
o 6 and the lower quotas were set to 4 at all companies. The pro-
ramme coordinator decided to set an upper quota of 2 for the for-
ign students at each company to enforce diversity. In 2017 there
as a slight change in the distributional criteria, the number of
tudents allocated to each company was set to be between 3 and
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Table 1 
The results of the 2016 matching run with the number of all and for- 
eign students assigned to the companies and the total rank of the stu- 
dents. 
2016 proﬁles all/foreign total rank 
Solution 1: MinRank-Stable 6 1 6 6 6 34 
u i = 6 1 0 0 2 2 
Solution 2: MinRank-Stable 6 2 6 6 5 35 
l i = 2 , u i = 6 1 0 1 2 1 
Solution 3: MinRank-Stable 6 4 5 5 5 40 
u 1 = 6 , u i = 5(i = 2 . 5) 1 0 0 2 2 
Solution 4: MinRank-Stable 5 5 5 5 5 41 
u i = 5 0 2 0 2 1 
Solution 5: MinRank-EF 5 4 6 6 4 38 
l i = 4 , u i = 6 0 2 1 2 0 
Solution 6: MinOSB-EF 6 4 6 5 4 39 
l i = 4 , u i = 6 1 1 1 2 0 
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p   and at least one foreign student was required to be allocated to
very company. 
Our ﬁrst solution plan was to ask the students to rank all the
ompanies in a strict order and to ask the companies to evaluate
ll the CV-s and rank the students weakly by giving them scores
etween 1 and 10. 5 Our intention with allowing ties was to enlarge
he set of stable solutions, even though we understand that this
airness concept is a bit weaker, since we may accept a student and
eject another one with the same score. Allowing ties also makes
he problem NP-hard already with lower quotas, as we described
n the introduction. Yet, if the ties were not allowed then the set of
table (and envy-free) solutions would be much smaller and thus
t would be harder to satisfy the distributional constraints. 
We remark that the conditions of Theorem 1 are satisﬁed for
oth 2016 and 2017, since all the students have to rank (and ac-
ept) all the companies and in 2017 we were required to have at
east one foreign student at each company, where the number of
oreign students was more than the number of companies. There-
ore a complete within-type envy-free matching always existed.
ithin this set of solutions we decided to minimise the number of
nvies across types and their intensities as the primal objectives.
s secondary objectives we tried to minimise the total rank and
he number of open-slot blockings. 
Finally, since in both years it was possible to decrease the upper
uotas at all companies by one (and set them to 5 instead of 6),
e also examined these solutions. This was reasonable as allocat-
ng very different numbers of students to the companies seemed
roblematic, especially if some of the most popular companies was
orced not to ﬁll its quota, while less popular companies did. 
.2. Results in 2016 
The most important results of the 2016 matching run are col-
ected in Table 1 . 
In 2016 the upper bound of two for the foreign students were
lways satisﬁed without considering it, so we leave out this ques-
ion from the discussion and we focus only on common lower quo-
as. We were not able to ﬁnd a stable solution for the original quo-
as of 4–6, since one of the companies (number 2) was very un-
opular and the highest number of students that we could match
here in a stable solution was 2, this is Solution 2 in Table 1 . (For
he record, we also checked which would be the minimum rank
olution among the stable ones, that is Solution 1.) Therefore we
ecreased the upper quotas of all companies to 5, except the most
opular company (number 1) and found a stable matching with5 Most companies gave only integer scores, but some submitted half-integer 
cores as well, so ties indeed occurred. 
m  
a  
f  
s  inimum total rank (Solution 3). Note that this matching is envy-
ree for the original quotas. Finally we considered the possibility
f decreasing all the upper quotas to 5, as described in Solution 4.
rom the latter two solutions the decision maker decided to choose
olution 4, since it was not substantially different from Solution
 and for the companies it seemed to be easier to communicate
he common decrease of upper quotas, compared to the case when
nly one company has a larger number of students. 
Recently, after carefully investigating the solution concepts de-
cribed in this paper, we did another check on the possible results
nd computed Solutions 5 and 6. Solution 5 is an envy-free solu-
ion where the total rank is minimised. It was interesting to ob-
erve that the most popular company (number 1) does not ﬁll its
pper quota, leading to many open-slot blockings at that company.
olution 6 is also envy-free, but here the open-slot blockings are
inimised, but this resulted in a small decrease in the total rank. 
.3. Results in 2017 
The results of the 2017 matching run are summarised in
able 2 . In 2017 the number of students was 40 among which 13
ere from abroad and the number of companies was 8. Due to
he higher proportion of foreign students, the organisers decided
o require the allocation of at least one foreign student to each
ompany. The initial call suggested groups of sizes between 3 and
, but in this year also we investigated the solutions when every
pper quota was decreased to 5. In the latter case the lower quo-
as for the foreign students were not automatically satisﬁed, so we
ound within-type envy-free solutions and then as a ﬁrst objective
e either minimised the number of envies across types or we min-
mised the intensities of the envies. As a secondary objective we
ried to minimise the total rank (there was no open-slots blocking
hen the upper quotas were commonly set to 5). 
Solution 1 is envy-free, and the total rank is minimised. As intu-
tively expected, the two least popular companies have only three
tudents allocated each and a medium popular company has four
tudents, whilst the popular companies receive six students. Solu-
ions 2 and 3 are both within-type envy free for upper quotas 5.
olution 2 minimises the number of envies as the ﬁrst objective
nd then the total rank. Solution 3 minimises the intensities of the
nvies and then the total rank. (Note that we also computed the
inimal envy solutions without requiring within-type envy free-
ess, and essentially we received the same two solutions.) It is in-
eresting to know that only one justiﬁed envy was present in both
olutions 2 and 3, and the intensity of this envy was 1 in Solution
 and 1 2 in Solution 3. However, these two solutions were rather
ifferent, and Solution 2 had much smaller total rank. Thus So-
ution 2 was clearly found better than Solution 3 by the decision
aker. When comparing the ﬁrst two solutions, the decision maker
elected Solution 2, due to the more balanced sizes of groups. 
.4. Discussion, further questions 
Here we discuss our ﬁndings and possible questions for the fu-
ure. 
Importance of the distributional requirements. We have con-
idered our distributional constraints as hard bounds, the only re-
axation we tested was the common decrease of the upper quotas.
owever, in many applications the distributional goals are softer,
nd thus may be violated. For instance, in school choice the exact
roportionality with regard to ethnicity or gender may be too de-
anding and unnecessary to satisfy, these are rather just general
ims. In such situations one may insist on the stability or the envy
reeness of the solution and want to satisfy the distributional con-
traints as much as possible. Finally, the trade-off between fairness
66 K.C. Ágoston et al. / Operations Research Perspectives 5 (2018) 59–68 
Table 2 
The results of the 2017 matching run with the number of all and foreign students assigned to 
the companies and the total rank of the students. 
2017 proﬁles all/foreign total rank 
Solution 1: MinRank-EF 6 3 6 6 6 3 6 4 66 
l i = 3 , u i = 6 1 1 1 4 1 1 3 1 
Solution 2: MinRank-Min#E-CWTEFM 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 85 
u i = 5 , wEF, min 1 3 2 3 1 1 1 1 
Solution 3: MinRank-MinEI-CWTEFM 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 105 
u i = 5 1 4 1 2 1 1 1 2 
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s  and distributional goals may be balanced by relaxing both require-
ments at the same time. 
Stability versus envy-freeness. Leaving some slots empty to
satisfy the distributional constraints is a natural way to relax sta-
bility. This is also used in the Japanese resident allocation pro-
gramme, where artiﬁcial upper quotas have been set to the hospi-
tals in order to satisfy the regional lower quotas [30] . However, the
open-slot blocking can also be seen as unfair from both the stu-
dents’ and the companies’ points of views, especially when a pop-
ular company has to give up an intern. Note also that the open-slot
blockings are relative to the original quotas. In our application the
decision maker ended up choosing solutions in both years where
the upper quotas of the companies were commonly reduced by
one. These solutions admit a high number of open-slot blockings
regarding the original quotas, whilst if they are envy free for the
original quotas then they are also stable (with no open-slot block-
ings) for the decreased quotas. Thus these chosen solutions can be
seen more fair from the students’ point of view, as they do not
regret their rejections by a company with an open slot. 
Importance of within-type envy-freeness. In our analyses we
assumed that within-type envy-freeness is an important require-
ment that we obeyed in all solutions. Note that in the 2017 run
we also tested the solution when this requirement was relaxed and
we did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant difference in the solutions. It is an in-
teresting question how important this requirement is, and the an-
swer can depend on the actual application. If the separation of the
types is signiﬁcant and there is a big difference between their per-
formance (e.g. regarding the ethnicity in college admission) then
within-type envy-freeness can be crucial. 
Minimising the number of justiﬁed envies or their intensi-
ties. In our 2017 run we had a signiﬁcant difference between our
two recommended solutions based on minimising the number of
justiﬁed envies and their intensities, respectively. In our case the
former solution had much better total ranking for the students,
but one can easily create an example where the opposite would
happen. If the intensities of the blocking are minimised then this
means that the average difference between the scores of the stu-
dents who have envy towards one another is small. This can be
more acceptable than having large score differences. In fact, if the
maximum score difference is not higher than the one in our appli-
cation, then we could say that this solution could be seen as to be
weakly stable if the scoring by the companies were less ﬁner, say
used score range 1–5 instead of the current range of 1–10. 
Strict versus weak rankings. Using ties in the rankings of the
companies was by our recommendation in order to enlarge the
set of stable (or envy-free) matchings. However, in this case sta-
bility (and envy-freeness) is weaker, the rejection of a student by
a company can be explained by the admittance of another student
with equal score or higher. Thus, this can be seen unfair by the
rejected student, therefore in many applications (e.g. school choice
in New York, Boston and college admissions in Ireland and Turkey)
the ties are broken by lotteries or by other random factors. Ties
make the problem of satisfying lower quotas NP-hard, whilst this
is a polynomial-time solvable problem for strict rankings, see e.g.T  25] . Furthermore, the mechanism can become highly manipulable
y the students for ties depending on the goals of the optimisation.
Incentive issues. A mechanism is strategy-proof for the stu-
ents if neither of them can get a better match by submitting
alse preferences. This property holds for the student-proposing
eferred-acceptance mechanism in the classical college admission
odel of Gale and Shapley (see e.g. [43] ). Strategy-proofness can
lso be satisﬁed by modiﬁed variants of the deferred-acceptance
echanism for the case of lower quotas, as suggested also for the
apanese resident allocations [27,30,31] . However, if we allow ties
nd we consider goals such as rank-minimisation then our mech-
nism becomes manipulable. A simple manipulation strategy for a
edium-strong student can be to put her top choice as ﬁrst choice,
ut instead of putting her true second choice in the second slot
he can put some companies which are not achievable for her in
ny stable solution. If there is another student with the very same
core and very same preferences submitting her true preferences
nd there is only one place left at their most preferred company
hen the rank-maximising algorithm will assign the manipulating
tudent there, and the truth-telling student to the second com-
any, since the alternative solution by exchanging the two students
ould result in higher total rank. Despite of this issue of manipu-
ability, we believe that the expected gains of manipulations are
egligible and their risks can be high, so in a Bayesian sense it is
nlikely that a student could get a positive expected gain by ma-
ipulating. However, we admit that this hypothesis would be very
ard to prove formally. 
Bounding the length of preference lists. In 2016 there were
5 students and 5 companies, in 2017 there were 40 students and
 companies, so the screening costs of the companies have in-
reased a lot. If this tendency will continue then the organisers
f the programme may need to reconsider the requirement of pro-
iding full rankings. A reasonable solution in such situations is to
ave two rounds. In the ﬁrst the students are required to rank
 ﬁxed number of companies, say ﬁve), and it is not guaranteed
hat all the students can be allocated to acceptable companies that
hey ranked. In the second round either no preferences are asked
rom the students or the organisers can elicit the preferences of
he unmatched students over the companies with remaining po-
itions. This is a standard technique also in school choice (e.g. in
ew York [3] ), although here we would face new challenges to en-
ure the satisfaction of the distributional requirements. 
. Second application: workshop assignment 
After running the 2016 project allocation, we received very pos-
tive feedbacks from the students, and in fact two students ap-
roached us asking for a help in selecting and assigning confer-
nce participants to companies involved in a case study workshop
ithin the conference. 
The number of participants to be selected was 60, and they had
o be assigned to three companies in a given proportion, the ﬁrst
ompany had to receive 16 students and at least 8 Hungarians, the
econd and the third companies had to receive 22 students each.
here were 13 pre-selected students (the country leaders of the or-
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p  anisation) whose assignments were ﬁxed in advance, so we only
ad to select and assign the 47 remaining slots. 
The conference organisers also agreed on the proportion of the
ocal, regional and other students to be selected. In particular, we
ad to select 25 Hungarian students from the 29 Hungarian appli-
ants, further 12 regional students from the 15 regional applicants
outside Hungary) and 10 other students from the 19 other appli-
ants (outside the region). Thus, we had overall exact quotas (i.e.
qual lower and upper quotas) for each type of students, just as
escribed in (8) and (9) . 
In order to satisfy these requirements we thought that we not
nly try to keep the solution within-type envy-free, which is also
table with type-speciﬁc scores as proved in Theorem 2 , but we
ried to keep the extra scores given to each type of students be
he same across companies. We call this solution concept a sta-
le matching with equal type-speciﬁc scores . With an iterative test-
ng we could indeed ﬁnd such a stable solution by adding 7 extra
oints to all Hungarian students, 3 extra points to all regional stu-
ents, and zero to the other students, where the students had to
ank all the three companies and the companies gave scores (1–10)
n all the applicants. 
It is an interesting question whether a stable matching with
qual type-speciﬁc scores always exists in our model, under the
ssumption that all pairs are acceptable. We state this as a conjec-
ure below and prove it for two types. 
onjecture 3. When all the pairs are acceptable then a stable match-
ng with equal type-speciﬁc scores always exists for exact quotas. 
To prove the conjecture for two types, we will use some well-
nown theorems listed below. 
heorem 4 (Well-known results on HR/HRT instances) . 
i) (Characterisation, see e.g. [29] ) A matching M is weakly stable for
an instance I of HRT if and only if it is stable for an instance I ′ of
HR that is obtained by some tie-breaking from I. 
ii) (Rural hospitals [41] ) For an instance I of HR the set of allocated
students and the number of seats ﬁlled at the companies are ﬁxed
across the stable matchings. 
ii) (Vacancy chains [16] ) Suppose that I is an instance of HR. If I ′ is
obtained from I by adding a new student a i then the set of allo-
cated students either 1) remains the same, 2) it is extended by a i ,
or 3) it is extended by a i and another student, a j becomes unal-
located. If I ′ is obtained from I by increasing the upper quota of a
company then the set of allocated students either 1) remains the
same, or 2) it is extended by one student. 
roof. [of Conjecture 3 for two types] Suppose that we have
 project allocation problem with two types of students, A 1 =
 a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n 1 } and A 2 = { a n 1 +1 , a n 1 +2 , . . . , a n 1 + n 2 } , companies C =
 c 1 , . . . , c m } and exact quotas L 1 = U 1 and L 2 = U 2 . Let U denote
he total capacity, i.e., U = ∑ j=1 .m u j . Without loss of generality we
uppose that L 1 + L 2 = U with L 1 ≤n 1 and L 2 ≤n 2 , and m ≤ n 1 + n 2 ,
hich implies that all the weakly stable matchings have size U ,
ince we assume that every student-company pair is mutually ac-
eptable. Let e denote the extra score given to students of the ﬁrst
ype. Note that if e is a high number then all the ﬁrst type stu-
ents are admitted up to the total quota and if e is very small
negative) then all the second type student are admitted up to the
otal quota. However, the number of ﬁrst type students admitted
oes not necessarily grow when we increase e . 6 Let I denote the6 The following example illustrates this. Let us have A 1 = { a 1 , a 2 , a 3 } and A 2 = 
 a 4 , a 5 } , and C = { c 1 , c 2 , c 3 } with quota 1 at each company. Suppose that every stu- 
ent prefers c 1 to c 2 and c 2 to c 3 . The students have the following scores: s 1 , 1 = 
 , s 1 , 2 = 7 , s 1 , 3 = 1 , s 2 , 1 = 1 , s 2 , 2 = 1 , s 2 , 3 = 3 , s 3 , 1 = 1 , s 3 , 2 = 1 , s 3 , 3 = 1 , s 4 , 1 = 6 , 
 4 , 2 = 1 , s 4 , 3 = 6 , s 5 , 1 = 2 , s 5 , 2 = 6 , s 5 , 3 = 2 . When no extra score is added to A 1 then 
b  
e  
t
s
triginal instance of HRT and let I e be the instance of HRT obtained
fter adding points e to all students in A 1 . For a matching M let
 M | 1 denote the number of ﬁrst type student allocated and simi-
arly, let | M | 2 denote the number of second type students allocated
n M . The goal is to ﬁnd a suitable extra score e such that there ex-
sts a weakly stable matching M for I e such that | M| 1 = L 1 (which
mplies that | M| 2 = L 2 ). In fact, we will construct a HR instance I ′ e ,
btained from I e by tie-breaking, such that matching M is stable
or I ′ e with the required distributional property. 
As we already noted, if e is a large negative number then | M| 1 =
 for any stable matching M in I e and if e is a very large positive
umber then | M| 1 = min { n 1 , m } . For instance I e of HRT, let I < 1 e de-
ote the HR instance where all the ties are broken in favour of A 1 
tudents (and among the students of the same type we use an ar-
itrary tie-breaking, say, according to their indices). Similarly, let
 
< 2 
e denote the HR instance, where we break all the ties in favour
f A 2 students. First, we have to observe that I < 1 e is the same as
 
< 2 
e +1 for any e . Note also that the number of allocated ﬁrst type stu-
ents (and their set) is ﬁxed for any HR instance by Theorem 4 /ii)
cross all stable matchings. Therefore there must exist a number e
uch that for any stable matching M e −1 for instance I < 1 e −1 (= I < 2 e ) we
ave | M e −1 | 1 ≤ L 1 , and for any stable matching M e for instance I < 1 e 
e have | M e | 1 ≥ L 1 . We will show that there is an instance I ′ e , ob-
ained by tie-breaking from I e , such that for every stable matching
he number of allocated A 1 students is exactly L 1 . 
We start from I < 2 e and we will gradually transform it into I 
< 1 
e 
y giving higher priority in the tie-breaking to one A 1 student in
ach step. Let I 0 e = I < 2 e , and for each i ∈ [1 .n 1 ] let I i e denote the HR
nstance where we favour the students { a 1 , . . . , a i } over students in
 
2 , who are favoured to students in { a i +1 , . . . , a n 1 } . What we will
how is that if M is any stable matching for I i e and M 
′ is any stable
atching for I i +1 e then | M| 1 − 1 ≤ | M ′ | ≤ | M| 1 + 1 , so the number
f A 1 students allocated can either increase or decrease by at most
ne. This will imply that we must get an instance I i e , where the
umber of ﬁrst type students is exactly L 1 . 
To prove the above inequalities we have to consider two situ-
tions. First, let us assume that a i +1 is unmatched in M (and so
n every stable matching for I i e ). Thus M would also be stable if we
emove a i +1 from I i e . Let us now put back a i +1 , but with higher pri-
rity, creating instance I i +1 e . By Theorem 4 /iii) either the number of
 
1 students remains the same or it increases by one. Suppose now
hat a i +1 is allocated in M to company c j . M will remain stable if
e remove both a i +1 and one seat at c j from I i e , while the num-
er of A 1 students allocated in the reduced matching decreases by
ne. If we add back one seat at c j and subsequently we also add
ack a i +1 with increased priority, creating instance I i +1 e , then from
heorem 4 /iii) we know that in each of these two steps the num-
er of A 1 students matched either remains the same or increases
y one. So, in overall, the number of A 1 students can either de-
rease by one, remain the same, or increase by one. This completes
ur proof. 
. Conclusion 
We investigated different solution concepts for stable match-
ng problems with distributional constraints motivated by two real
pplications where we had to design the allocation mechanism.
e chose integer programming as the solution technique which
roved to be successful for these relatively small applications. We
elieve that our solution concepts and techniques could be consid-
red in other applications as well, such as controlled school choicehe unique stable matching is M = { a 1 c 2 , a 2 c 3 , a 4 c 1 } , and when we increase the 
core of students in A 1 then the unique stable matching is M ′ = { a 1 c 1 , a 4 c 3 , a 5 c 2 } , 
hus the number of ﬁrst type students allocated decreases. 
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 and university admission with aﬃrmative action. As far as the par-
ticipants are concerned, we have received very positive feedbacks
from both the students and the companies, especially compared to
the previous years. There are still plenty of interesting questions to
investigate mostly about the importance of different fairness crite-
ria and the trade-off between fairness and the distributional re-
quirements. 
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